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‘Tenderpreneur’ is a South African colloquialism for a businessperson who uses political 
contacts to secure government procurement contracts (called ‘tenders’) often as part of 
reciprocal exchange of favours or benefits. The term is a portmanteau of ‘tender’ (to provide 
business services) and ‘entrepreneur’. Today, ‘tenderpreneurs’ are associated with 
corruption, nepotism and clientelism. This is because the award of many tenders is driven by 
informal interests and/or political affiliation, rather than the requirements of formal 
procedure. The informality of ‘tenderpreneurship’ thus resides in these extra-legal social and 
political relationships. 
 
The term ‘tenderpreneur’ first emerged during the rule of President Thabo Mbeki (1999-
2008). Initially, the term had an ambivalent meaning, with both positive and negative 
undertones (Dlamini 2010). On the one hand, it was associated with the advancement of black 
entrepreneurs who entered into the private business sector on a legitimate basis under the 
framework of state policies to enable the advancement of ‘black designated groups’ in 
commerce and industry. Thus the South African Constitution, in terms of Section 217, permits 
organs of the state to implement preferential procurement to advance opportunities for 
persons previously disadvantaged under Apartheid (Constitution 1996). These policies 
successfully enabled commercial opportunities for black businesses as partners and outright 
suppliers, who would otherwise struggle to compete within a private sector dominated by 
established white owned businesses. Key policies to advance this objective include the 
Preferential Procurement Policy Framework (PPPFA 2000) and the Black Economic 
Empowerment (BEE) Act and subsequent Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 
(BBBEE 2004). 
 
On the other hand, tenderpreneurship has a negative connotation associated with corrupt 
practices. The association was particularly noticeable in respect to state procurement 
processes whereby tenders to supply goods and services were increasingly awarded to 
individuals with personal linkages to the ruling political party, the African National Congress 
(ANC) (Dlamini 2010). One of the highest profile early examples was the South African Arms 
Deal, initiated in 1999, in which bribes were paid to high-ranking politicians, fixers, the ANC, 
and allied community development projects (Southall 2008). Key to this transition is the ANC’s 
ideology of liberation nationalism that defines the party as the champion of the black 
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oppressed, who constitute the primary part of the South African nation; and its intersection 
with the access to resources enabled by party dominance at election time (Piper 2015). 
 
Tenderpreneurship is distinguishable from other forms of manipulation of the system of black 
empowerment in the scale of economic theft. Under the objective of advancing opportunities 
for black business advancement, state organs have instituted regulations to enable 
favourable procurement through two tracks, one via a system of three competitive quotes, 
‘3Qs’ (below a value threshold) and via tenders (above a value threshold) (Corruption Watch 
2014). Both tracks have resulted in system manipulation. In the early 2000s, terms such as 
the ‘3Qs’ emerged to describe black entrepreneurs who had acquired state contracts via the 
competitive quote pipeline, though these were usually of smaller value (Personal 
communication to Charman, Limpopo entrepreneurs).  
 
These ‘3Qs’ contracts were typically given to those who had a relationship to the government 
official in charge of minor procurements. These actions constituted a form of nepotism and 
improper favouritism. Large value procurements (above R200,000) were subject to more 
complex tender processes (Corruption Watch 2014). The current PPPF Regulations (2017) 
detail criteria for evaluating state tenders, permitting state organs to apply pre-qualifying 
criteria to advance businesses with high black empowerment (BBBEE) status or smaller 
businesses. This mechanism is used to exclude less BBBEE-compliant service providers and 
stack the weighting within the tender evaluation process in favour of business entities with 
strong BBBEE status and (informal) political connections.  
 
Under the Zuma Presidency, tenderpreneurship has become synonymous with tender 
manipulation and corruption in state procurement, notably in respect to large value contract 
procurement to supply South African state owned companies with goods and services 
(Southall 2011). In South African law, corruption means the private use of public funds, 
bribery of public officials and improper favouritism by government officials (PRECCA 2004). In 
2016 Transparency International (2016) ranked South Africa 64 out of 167 countries in the 
world. It received the score of 45 out of 100 where zero is completely corrupt and 100 
completely clean. 
 
In some of the most celebrated cases of tenderpreneurship, the tenderpreneur seeks to 
cultivate a relationship with politicians (and their families) by supporting and financing their 
careers. The most famous example of this is the relationship between President Jacob Zuma 
and the Gupta family, comprising the three brothers Ajay, Atul, and Rajesh. Originating in 
Uttar Pradesh, India, the Gupta brothers immigrated to South Africa in 1993 to establish a 
foothold for their emerging business, which included Sahara Computers. The Guptas swiftly 
established political patronage with ANC leaders. In the early 2000s, the Guptas had begun to 
invest in Jacob Zuma as a future president. The family cultivated their relationship with the 
future President via employing members of his household, including one of his wives, a 
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daughter, a son and a nephew. Newspaper reports and studies have complied evidence that 
the Guptas have channelled funding to support Zuma and his political career via employment, 
favours, bribes and kickbacks (Pauw 2017, Pilling & Cotterill 2017, Southall 2011). In reward 
for their financial generosity, the Guptas have received substantial government procurement 
contracts, especially in the energy sector (Conway Smith 2017). Through preferential 
procurement, large tenders in particular, the Guptas were able to expand their business 
interest into the mineral sector, acquiring coalmines and in turn wining a tender with Eskom, 
the state energy provider, to supply coal, with Eskom paying an inflated price for an inferior 
product (Pilling & Cotterill 2017).  
 
In governance terms, tenderpreneurship has two major implications. First, tenderpreneurship 
is (rightly) associated with poor service delivery and over-charging of the state, with tender 
often awarded to companies lacking competency. It is not uncommon for tenderpreneur 
companies to be registered for the sole purpose of accessing a state procurement 
opportunities through preferential bidding (Corruption Watch 2014). The preselection 
process enables corrupt government officials to bias the procurement outcome towards 
companies deemed to be eligible of high BBBEE status, ignoring matters of competency that 
is only considered in subsequent phases of the process. In many instances, tenderpreneur 
companies exist as shell organisations that sub-contract out to other contractors (often 
established white owned businesses) to do the actual work. This process is known as ‘fronting’ 
(Bolton 2006). Over-charging for goods and services means that both the tenderpreneur and 
their client in the state can extract profits from the fulfilment of the tender. Where 
tenderpreneurship results in poor service delivery, this in turn undermines public 
accountability and fuels mistrust towards government officials.  
 
Second, tenderpreneurship has become associated with maintaining the political status quo 
through strategies that include undermining civil society. The Guptas, for example, have 
invested in newspapers and TV media to generate positive news around the ANC and 
President Jacob Zumba in particular, whilst simultaneously engaging the public relations firm 
Bell Pottinger to produce ‘fake news’ and a counter-narrative against tenderpreneurship 
(Plaut 2017). This particular narrative sought to shift the political critique to rally against 
‘white monopoly capitalism’ which was taken as symbolic name for corporate business and 
continued dominance of white own businesses in the economy. The slogan ‘radical economic 
transformation’ (the current anti-business establishment narrative), has linkages (in terms of 
deriving financial support) to tenderpreneurs and ‘criminal enterprises’ embedded in corrupt 
relationships with high ranking officials in the Zuma political fold (Pauw, J, 2017, Pilling & 
Cotterill 2017).  
 
Political commentators have described tenderpreneurship as linked to a ‘dominant party 
syndrome’ of the ruling political party, the African National Congress (ANC) (Giliomee & 
Simkins 1998). The ANC has won every national election for the last 25 years with over 60% 
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of the vote. This lack of electoral accountability at the national level (and in most 
municipalities, apart from the large metropolitan municipalities) means that ANC politicians 
get returned to office even when government does not perform as committed on 
development plans, or simply performs poorly. Consequently, many in the ANC take political 
office for granted and abuse it by enabling non-competitive procurement, tenderpreneurship 
and nepotism in employment. This dominant party syndrome has advanced to a state of 
kleptocracy, whereby the political elites manipulate the three arms of government 
(legislature, executive and judiciary) with the intention of capturing resources for self-
enrichment, the ‘elite capture’ (Booysen 2015). The growing perception of Zuma’s rule as 
kleptocracy is beginning to hurt the ANC in the realm of public debates.  For the first time, in 
the local government elections of 2016 four of the largest metropolitan municipalities 
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